D o e s P u b l i c C a p i t a l C r o w d O u t P r i v a t e C a p i t a l ?
D o e s P u b l i c C a p i t a l C r o w d O u t P r i v a t e C a p i t a l ? I. Introduction
David Aschauer* This paper is an empirical investigation into the effects of government spending on private investment from a neoclassical perspective. The central focus of the paper is on the question: does higher public capital accumu lation "crowd out" private investment in plant and equipment? On neoclassical grounds, the answer to this question is seen to depend upon two fundamental, opposing forces. On the one hand, higher public invest ment raises the national rate of capital accumulation above the level chosen (in a presumed rational fashion) by private sector agents; thus, public cap ital spending may crowd out private expenditures on capital goods on an e x a n te basis as individuals seek to reestablish an optimal intertemporal allocation of resources. On the other hand, public capital-particularly infrastructure capital such as highways, water systems, sewers, and airports-is likely to bear a complementary relationship with private capital in the private production technology. Thus, higher public investment may raise the marginal productivity of private capital and, thereby, "crowd in" private investment. Isolating these separate effects will allow: (1) a test of the appropriateness of the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy (the former effect); (2) information on the productivity of public capital (the latter ef fect); and (3) a resolution to the query of whether or not public capital spending can affect the national capital stock to a substantive degree.
The earliest conventional macroeconomic analyses of the effect of public spending-specifically, public capital expenditures-on private investment emphasized an e x p o s t crowding out via the effect of fiscal policy on interest rates; to the extent that an increase in the level of public expenditure cre ated an excess demand for current resources, interest rates would rise and reduce the level of private capital spending. In classical, full-employment models of the economy, the reduction in private investment per unit of public spending would be equal to -i r!(ir + cr)
where ir and cr measure the sensitivity of private investment and consump tion to a change in interest rates. In the extreme of a perfectly inelastic private savings schedule (cr = 0), higher public spending would crowd out private investment on a one-to-one basis; given some elasticity of savings; however, part of the burden of higher public spending would fall on the present as the rise in interest rates induced a reduction in the current level of consumption spending.1 A t the opposite end of the spectrum, Keynesian models of the "sticky price" variety predicted a smaller negative effect of government spending on private capital accumulation as the interest sensi tivity of money demand allowed a rise in output to be compatible with money market equilibrium and, therefore, less of a need for a higher level of interest rates to reestablish goods market equilibrium. In this case, the effect on private investment is given by 
where m n rriy are the sensitivities of money demand to interest rates and in come and sy is the marginal propensity to save out of income. In the ex treme case of infinitely interest sensitive money demand-the "liquidity trap"-interest rates would not rise pursuant to a rise in government spending and consequently there would be no effect on the level of private investment.
Indeed, the advent of accelerator (and, subsequently, flexible accelerator) theories of private investment led to the conclusion that fiscal policy, by stimulating aggregate demand and output, might "crowd in" capital spending by firms. Given the previous level of output, investment would be crowded in given that I m r I % -\ h I * my > 0
as in this case any negative effect on investment arising from a rise in in terest rates would be dominated by the positive effect operating through a higher level of output and the consequent need for expanded capacity.2'3
Later discussion centered on the implications of changes in wealth associ ated with government debt issuance and, thereby, on consumption and as set demand. Assuming that the higher public expenditure is debt financed and that expansions of public debt raise wealth, both consumption and money demand were argued to rise. As the former effect tends to stimulate production but the latter effect to raise interest rates, their net impact on output and private investment would be ambiguous, a point discussed by Silber (1970). Blinder and Solow (1973) took such wealth effects as the starting point for their analysis of the effects of fiscal policies, but focused on the requirement that the budget be balanced in long-run equilibrium. In such an environment, bond-financed government spending was neces sarily stimulative since a rise in income was required to finance interest payments on the higher level of public debt.
A dramatically different analysis o f crowding out was pursued by David and Scadding (1974), in which they emphasized the possibility o f an e x a n te crowding out o f private by public expenditure. Specifically, they argued that a rise in government bond issuance crowded out an equal amount of private investment because deficit finance is regarded as public investment and the latter substitutes for private capital spending. Tax-financed gov ernment spending, on the other hand, was taken as government consump tion and to crowd out an equivalent amount of private consumption. Thus, fiscal policy was seen as having no effect on the level of aggregate demand. O f course, this argument is consistent with an "ultrarational" consumer only if public capital expenditures are, as a rule, debt financed.
More recently, Barro (1974) offered the possibility that the method of fi nance of public expenditure-whether by debt or taxes-is irrelevant to ag gregate economic outcomes. As is now well known, this analysis involves private savings acting as a buffer against changes in the financial position of the public sector; a bond-financed tax cut (of a lump-sum variety) pro motes an equal e x a n te rise in private savings to match the implicit future tax liability with the result that interest rates, output, and the price level are left unaffected. The crucial point, however, is that to the extent that this "equivalence" between public finance methods holds, it makes sense to concentrate on the real aspects of fiscal policy-the temporal pattern of government purchases, changes in distortional tax rates, and-as in the current paper-alterations in the composition of public spending as poten tially powerful channels of influence on the private sector economy. 
II. A Neoclassical Analysis
The theoretical analysis which follows assumes a competitive economy populated by similar, infinitely lived individuals. The discussion is heuristic; for detail the reader is referred to Arrow and Kurz (1970), Aschauer (1988a), Aschauer and Greenwood (1983), and Barro (1988).4 The relationship between private investment and public spending which holds in general equilibrium may be expressed as
where i -private investment, <j> = the marginal product of private capital, i 8 = public investment or capital account expenditure, and c g = government consumption or current account spending. Here, a rise in the marginal product of private capital raises the level of private investment as individ uals respond to the higher marginal return to future production by post poning consumption, raising savings, and, in equilibrium, increasing capital accumulation.
A unit increase in public investment, given the rate of return to private capital, will change private investment by the amount
where m p c = marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and f kg = marginal product of public capital in private production. However, given that the public capital stock is at a level such that the marginal products of private and public capital are not equated, a change in public investment-and a marginal change in the public capital stock-will affect the wealth o f the private sector agents. Suppose that the public capital stock is "too low" so that f kg > < /> . In such a situation, an increase in public investment and equal crowding out of private investment would raise future output, creating a positive future income effect. Con sumers, in response to the improved allocation of resources, would raise current consumption and lower savings, with the result of a further decline in private capital accumulation.
The impact of public consumption spending on private investment depends on three considerations, namely: the extent to which the public sector goods and services substitute for their private sector counterparts; the persistence of the expenditure change; and the time profile of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Let a change in current public consumption expenditure be followed by a change in future such purchases equal to a times the current change. Hence if the current shock is transitory, a = 0 while if permanent, a = 1. Then the effect of a one unit increase in public consumption spending on private investment is given bỹ ((1 -ugc -f g j l^i m p c 1 -a * m p c )
where ugr = marginal rate of substitution of public for private consumption goods and services, fgc = marginal product of public current account spending in private production, and m p c f = marginal propensity to con sume in the future out of wealth.
Clearly, if ugc + f gc = 1 there is no effect of a change in the level of public current account spending on the agent's effective intertemporal consump tion opportunities and private investment is left unaltered. The higher public expenditure crowds out private consumption spending and directly expands production to a degree such as to leave the intertemporal allo cation of resources and thereby, private savings and investment undisturbed.
However, available empirical evidence suggests that public spending sub stitutes poorly for private consumption. Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) obtain estimates of ugc in the range (.2, .4). The evidence also indi cates that public expenditure may have a relatively minor direct effect on production. On the basis of British data Ahmed (1986) uncovers an esti-mate of f gc of .39 while Aschauer (1988c) finds no discernable impact of public current account spending on total factor productivity. Accordingly, a rise in the level of government consumption would be expected to reduce the agent's effective consumption possibilities and potentially induce a change in private investment as the agent reallocates the "burden" of the public sector expansion intertemporally.
Assuming 0 < ugc + f gc < 1, consider the case where the rise in public con sumption is permanent, a = 1. Private investment will be unaltered if the time profile of the aggregate marginal propensity to consume is flat since the average agent would choose to bear the implied negative wealth effect equally over time. On the other hand, if the agent's marginal propensity to consume profile has an upward (downward) tilt, private investment will fall (rise) as he chooses to bear a relatively large proportion of the wealth effect in the future (present).
Finally, assuming that 0 < ugc + f gc < 1 and m p c = m pd\ but the change in public consumption spending is to some extent transitory, we have the im pact on investment given by
so that a rise in public spending induces less than an equal decline in private investment.
Thus, on net, a rise in public consumption expenditure may have a negative impact on private capital accumulation, the effect being more probable (a) the more transitory is the rise in public purchases and/or (b) the less the publicly provided goods substitute for private consumption and yield direct productive benefits.
The marginal product of private capital is given by the expression <f> =/*(*,
where k = private capital stock, k 8 = public capital stock, and c8 = public spending on current account. A distinctive feature of public capital-particularly infrastructure capital such as streets and highways, sewers, water systems, airports, and the like-is that it is likely to bear a complementary relationship to private capital. Specifically, a higher level of public capital of this type is expected to raise the marginal productivity of private capital, or f k kg > 0. Further, it would be reasonable to argue that military capital would have a smaller effect on the productivity of private capital. A rise in public spending on nondurables and services more likely has an ambiguous effect on the marginal product of private capital. While the current expenses of maintaining a police force and fire departments may lead to a higher rate of return to capital, expenditures on regulatory insti-tutions and pollution control no doubt depress the return to capital as firms are forced to seek less (private) cost-effective methods of production.
Hence, along neoclassical lines a rise in public investment expenditure has an ambiguous effect on private investment. On the one hand, to the extent that public and private capital stocks are substitutable for one another in the private production technology, higher public investment crowds out an equivalent amount of private capital spending. On the other hand, the fact of government provision leads to a presumption that public capital yields substantial external effects by raising the productivity of private factors of production. Depending on their relative potency, the interaction of these two forces could result in either a decrease or increase in private capital expenditures.
The empirical analysis below seeks to evaluate the appropriateness of the neoclassical approach to the crowding out of public expenditure by un scrambling these conflicting effects of government spending on private in vestment. Specifically, it attempts to provide answers to the following questions: (1) Does a higher public capital stock-of either nonmilitary or military goods raise the marginal product of private capital? (2) Given any effect of public capital accumulation on the return to private capital, does higher public investment crowd out private investment? (3) Does higher government consumption expenditure raise the marginal product of capital? Crowd out private investment? (4) What is the total impact of public capital expenditure on the level of private investment?
III. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis focuses on the effect of public expenditure on private investment and the rate of return to private capital. The private investment series is net fixed investment in nonresidential equipment and structures and is obtained from where t = time. Ink = natural logarithm of the net private capital stock, Ink* = natural logarithm of the net public capital stock, and cu = capacity utilization rate.7 The neoclassical model sketched out above implies c2 > 0 , 63 < 0 (and close to a value of -1 given a public capital stock near its optimal level), c*6 < 0 (given f k k < 0), and c7 > 0 (given f k kg > 0). A rise in the capacity utilization rate would be expected to raise the marginal product of capital if movements in the former variable were due to either demand-side or technological shocks, so cH > 0 . Estimation of the reduced form is undertaken by full information maximum likelihood methods to take into account the over-identifying restrictions implicit in the structural model. Specifically, these latter restrictions dictate that the stocks of private and public capital and the capacity utilization rate do not exert influence on the level of private investment apart from that operating on the marginal product of private capital. This will be the case provided that in the initial equilibrium the marginal utility of consumption is constant across time, the marginal product of capital equals the subjec tive rate of time preference, and movements in the capacity utilization rate do not invoke significant wealth effects.8 However, it is to be emphasized that the more appropriate interpretation to give to the results of statistical tests involving these cross-equation restrictions is simply in terms of as sessing the adequacy of the structural model in explaining the data rather than a direct test of an exactly specified theoretical model. It is interesting to note that the estimated rate of return equation includes a positive and statistically significant time trend, given the private and public capital stocks and the capacity utilization rate. There has been a concern in the literature about a "falling rate of profit'' over the last fifteen or twenty years. An ocular inspection of the data probably would lead one to conclude that indeed the rate of return to private capital has trended downward throughout the post-Korean War period. Feldstein and Sum mers (1977), however, argued that the apparent slump in the profitability o f nonfinancial corporate profit was in fact an illusion arising from a failure to take account of serial correlation and the low levels of capacity utiliza tion during the 1970s. An implication compatible with the neoclassical notion of quantities re sponding to price movements, then, is that it is not possible to reject at usual significance levels the hypothesis that the level of private investment is unaffected by the capacity utilization rate over and above the influence the latter variable has on the rate of return to private capital. Table 4 contains estimates of the separate effects of nonmilitary and mili tary investment on private investment as well as of the stocks of these two forms of capital on the return to private capital. The point estimate of the impact of military capital accumulation on private investment spending is such that a one dollar increase in purchases of military equipment and structures depresses investment by a mere 8 cents; furthermore, there is no statistical basis for rejecting the hypothesis of zero crowding out of private capital spending. The neoclassical interpretation of this result is that pri vate agents take such spending as a poor substitute for private capital, and as such, as a drain on wealth; consequently, military capital expenditures work to crowd out consumption as opposed to investment.9
The reduced form of the structural model is given
The results of Table 4 also indicate that the stock of military capital has no statistically discernable impact on the productivity of private capital. Even taking the point estimate of .02 as valid suggests that the influence of nonmilitary capital on the return to private capital is four times as large as that of military capital. Table 5 presents the effects of public consumption expenditure on the level of private investment and the return to nonfmancial corporate capital. Note first that public consumption carries only marginal explanatory power for the level of private capital accumulation and for the return to capital. Indeed, accepting the point estimates at face value leads to the conclusion that public investment and capital are of much greater statistical and quantitative importance to an explanation of movements in the endogenous variables. Note also that the point estimate of the coefficient on public nonmilitary investment is reduced substantially in absolute value from the value in Table 2 of .99 to .72, while its associated standard error increases from .17 to .21. This appears to be due to the strong collinearity between public nonmilitary investment and public consumption expenditure; the simple correlation coefficient between these two variables equals .88 while that between public nonmilitary and military investment is equal to -. 1 5 .
The conclusions to be drawn from the empirical analysis are that public nonmilitary capital-much more than military capital or government consumption-has substantial explanatory power for the level of private investment in equipment and structures as well as for the average return to private capital. While higher investment by the government sector crowds out private investment nearly one-to-one given the return to capital, it also works to raise the productivity o f capital which, in turn, crowds in private investment. In the following section, simulations are employed to illustrate the total impact of public capital expenditures on private investment.
IV. Public Investment, Private Investment, a n d the Rate of Return
An historical simulation over the sample period 1953 to 1986 was carried out for the estimated model of Table 2 
V. Conclusion
The United States has experienced a broad shift in public investment levels over the last thirty-five years. During the period 1953 to 1969 public non military capital accumulation averaged 1.5 percent of gross national prod uct while during the subsequent years 1970 to 1986 the percentage of total output devoted to this purpose has fallen to a mere 0.4. Among other groups, the National Commission on Public Works Improvement has re commended that annual spending on infrastructure double, from $45 billion to $90 billion, by the end of this century. Clearly, then, an impor tant question is the extent to which such additional public capital accumu-lation would crowd out private investment and, thereby, mitigate the impact of the public sector initiative on the national investment rate.
This paper has provided a preliminary, suggestive answer to this question. A t a superficial level, an increase in public investment may be expected to reduce private investment nearly one-to-one as the private sector utilizes the public capital for its required purposes rather than expand private capacity. A t a somewhat deeper level, however, a distinctive feature of public infrastructure capital is that it complements private capital in the pro duction and distribution of private goods and services. Thus, public in vestment might be thought to raise private investment as the former raises the profitability of private capital stocks. The empirical results show that while both channels appear to be operating, the net effect of a rise in public investment expenditure is likely to be a relatively small fall in private in vestment. Consequently, the national level of investment is lifted; public investment policy by no means appears to be "neutral" in its effects on the real economy. 3 Among others, Robert Eisner (1986) holds strongly to the view that government deficits "crowd in" private investment. In his words, subsequent to public debt issuance, "business will be able to produce more to meet our demand for more bread today, and build a new bakery now, as well, to meet our demand for more bread tomorrow." 
